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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
visions was at issue. The Court, reasoning that the intent of the
statute and the policy of preventing the probate of fraudulent wills
required a witness to testify as to the contents of the will, held that
the copy could not be admitted if the witness only testifies as to its
genuineness. The discussion of Kleefeld notes the hardship placed
on the proponent of the lost will and suggests that the witness'
recollection should be permitted to be refreshed by the copy of the
will.
The viability of limitations on the incorporation of municipali-
ties when the preservation of a comprehensive growth plan is at
stake was presented to the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, in Marcus v. Baron. Emphasizing the public policy consider-
ations underlying the plans, the court held that localities were not
prevented from enacting supplemental incorporation criteria al-
though the Village Law sets forth such criteria.
In the area of criminal law and procedure, the Court of Ap-
peals decided People v. Ferrara and Virag v. Hynes. The right to
counsel of a linen supplier subpoenaed by a grand jury investigat-
ing nursing home operator kickbacks was at issue in Ferrara.
Holding that no error was committed in denying the motion to
suppress, the Court of Appeals reasoned that no right to counsel
had attached since the interrogation by an informant uncovered
the intent to commit future crimes. The Court noted that right to
counsel was intended to protect the individual from the powerful
machinery of the state and not from the investigation of new, yet
to be committed, crimes.
In Virag v. Hynes, the Court of Appeals noted the presump-
tion of validity afforded a grand jury subpoena duces tecum and
held that the party contesting the validity of the subpoena must
establish that the materials sought lack relevancy to the investiga-
tion. Moreover, it was reasoned that the proper functioning of the
grand jury investigatory process necessitated a broader scope of
relevancy and the concomitant increased burden placed on the
challenging party.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
Article 3-Jurisdiction and Service, Appearance and Choice of
Court
CPLR 302(b): Long-arm statute unavailable in action seeking de-
termination of paternity and payment of child support against
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nonresident
CPLR 302(b) permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-
resident in a family court proceeding when the case involves an
obligation to pay support which has accrued under New York law.1
It has been unclear whether one seeking a declaration of paternity
against a nonresident can benefit from this provision by alleging
that an "obligation" to pay child support has accrued.2 Recently,
in Nilsa B.B. v. Clyde Blackwell H., 3 the Appellate Division, Sec-
ond Department, held that an obligation to pay support does not
accrue until "the parental tie has been determined to exist."'4
In Nilsa, the respondent, a resident of Missouri, made occa-
sional visits to New York to solicit business for his book company.5
The petitioner, a resident of New York, alleged that she had
formed an intimate relationship with the respondent and had en-
CPLR 302(b) provides in pertinent part:
A court in any matrimonial action or family court proceeding involving a demand
for support [or] alimony. . . may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respon-
dent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she no longer is a resident
or domiciliary of this state . . if the party seeking support is a resident of or
domiciled in this state at the time such demand is made, provided that this state
was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation, or the defen-
dant abandoned the plaintiff in this state, or the obligation to pay support, for]
alimony. . . accrued under the laws of this state or under an agreement executed
in this state.
CPLR 302(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (emphasis added).
2 At common law, there existed no obligation to support a child born out of wedlock.
Schneider v. Kennat, 267 App. Div. 589, 591, 47 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1st Dep't 1944); Carolyn
C. v. Frank G., 106 Misc. 2d 510, 513, 434 N.Y.S.2d 98, 101 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
To remedy this situation, the New York legislature enacted the Family Court Act (the Act).
The Act establishes that each parent must provide "for the necessary support and educa-
tion" of an illegitimate child. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 513 (McKinney 1975). Under the
Act, the family court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings to establish the pater-
nity of, and to order support for, illegitimate children. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 511 (Mc-
Kinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-1982). Although it has been said that the Act is ordered toward
determining the paternity of a child born out of wedlock as well as providing for its support,
Hough v. Light, 275 App. Div. 299, 300, 89 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (1st Dep't 1949); Geraldine K.
v. Elliot D. B., 99 Misc. 2d 720, 722, 417 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (Family Ct. Bronx County 1979),
it is clear that the primary purpose of the statute is to protect the welfare of the illegitimate
child. See, e.g., In re J., 50 App. Div. 2d 890, 891, 377 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (2d Dep't 1975);
Lock v. Fisher, 104 Misc. 2d 656, 660, 428 N.Y.S.2d 868, 871 (Family Ct. Westchester
County 1980); Johnson v. Berger, 51 Misc. 2d 513, 515, 273 N.Y.S.2d 484, 487 (Family Ct.
N.Y. County 1966).
84 App. Div. 2d 295, 445 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2d Dep't 1981).
Id. at 298, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
Id. at 300, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 583. It was alleged that between April 1977 and July 1979
the respondent came to New York every other week, remaining within the state for 1 to 3
days each time he visited. Id. at 295 & n.1, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 580 & n.1.
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gaged in sexual intercourse with him while he was visiting the
state.' A child was born as a result of this relationship, and the
respondent voluntarily provided the petitioner with support for
the child.7 When the payments ceased, the petitioner instituted a
family court proceeding, seeking a determination of paternity and
an order of support.' A summons and petition were served by per-
sonal delivery to the respondent in Missouri.9 The Family Court,
Rockland County, dismissed the petition, finding that there was no
basis to support an assertion of jurisdiction over the respondent.1 0
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
firmed," holding that before a court may exercise 302(b) jurisdic-
tion over a respondent in a paternity proceeding, an order estab-
lishing paternity must already be in effect. 2 When paternity has
not yet been established, the court reasoned, an "obligation" to
pay support has not "accrued" within the meaning of the statute.1
The court observed that although the "cause of action [for sup-
6 Id. at 295, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
Id. at 296, 301, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 580, 583.
8 Id. at 296, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
9 Id. The petitioner conceded that the respondent was a resident of Missouri at the
time process was served, and did not allege that he was a New York domiciliary. Id. at 301,
445 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
10 Id. at 296, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 580-81.
- Id., 445 N.Y.S.2d at 581. Although all four members of the panel joined the majority
opinion, written by Justice Margett, Presiding Justice Lazer and Justice Cohalan also con-
curred separately to express their discomfort with the present state of the law since it "pre-
vents New York residents from litigating here what properly should be litigated here." Id. at
307, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 587 (Lazer, P.J., concurring).
" Id. at 297, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 581; accord, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 104 Misc. 2d 611,
614, 428 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1980); see Sciame v. Sciame, 54 App.
Div. 2d 977, 977, 389 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31 (2d Dep't 1976); 1 WK&M T 302.19, at 3-137. After
rejecting the petitioner's assertions that jurisdiction could be sustained under CPLR 302(b),
the court considered the applicability of CPLR 301, which provides that jurisdiction can be
exercised "over persons ... as might have been exercised heretofore." CPLR 301 (1972).
The court focused upon the traditional view that one can be served within a state in which
he is present. 84 App. Div. 2d at 303, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 585. Recognizing that personal juris-
diction has been exercised over individuals doing business in New York under this "pres-
ence" doctrine, id. at 306, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 586; see ABKO Indus., Inc. v. Lennon, 52 App.
Div. 2d 435, 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (1st Dep't 1976), the court nonetheless rejected the
petitioner's attempt to benefit from this doctrine. 84 App. Div. 2d at 306, 445 N.Y.S.2d at
586. The court reasoned that application of the corporate presence doctrine to individuals is
an unwarranted extension of common-law principles, and that, in any event, the respondent
was not doing business at the time the action was commenced. Id.
11 84 App. Div. 2d at 297, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 581. The court assumed that the respondent
had not met the threshold requirement of 302(b) that the nonresident must have been "a
resident or domiciliary of this state" at one time. Id. at 297 n.3, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 581 n.3; see
CPLR 302(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
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port] accrues upon pregnancy," the corresponding obligation does
not accrue until "the cause of action has been found to have
merit."" Hence, the court concluded, the proviso in CPLR 302(b)
regarding the accrual of an obligation to pay support was not in-
tended to permit the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident
upon mere allegations of paternity.15
It is submitted that the Nilsa court has frustrated the legisla-
ture's attempt to broaden the availability of long-arm jurisdiction
in family court proceedings. By requiring the entry of a judicial
order or decree establishing paternity as a condition precedent to
the exercise of personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(b),16 the
court appears to have limited the utility of the statute's proviso
that jurisdiction can be premised upon obligations accruing under
New York law.17 Clearly, if a court has entered a prior decree es-
tablishing paternity and ordering support, it must have already ex-
ercised jurisdiction over the respondent's person.1 8 Once such an
" 84 App. Div. 2d at 298, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
I Id. at 299, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
x8 Although some courts have construed CPLR 302(b) in a manner consistent with the
Nilsa court's interpretation, see, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 104 Misc. 2d 611, 614, 428
N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1980), others indicate that the entry of a prior
order or decree is not a prerequisite to the accrual of an obligation under the statute. See
Gersten v. Gersten, 61 App. Div. 2d 745, 745, 401 N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (1st Dep't 1978);
Browne v. Browne, 53 App. Div. 2d 134, 137, 385 N.Y.S.2d 983, 986 (4th Dep't 1976);
Crofton v. Crofton, 106 Misc. 2d 546, 548-49, 434 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1980); Geiser v. Geiser, 102 Misc. 2d 862, 866, 424 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980).
17 It has been suggested that a petitioner, who is unable to benefit from CPLR 302(b)
because a prior order of paternity is lacking, "might proceed under the Uniform Support of
Dependents Law (DRL, art. 3-A (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1981-1982))." Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 104 Misc. 2d 611, 616, 428 N.Y.S.2d 608, 612 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
Under this statutory scheme, a petitioner may initiate a proceeding for child support in her
own state, and cause the litigation file to be transported to the state which can exercise
jurisdiction over the respondents person and enter an order for support. See DRL § 41
(1977). It is submitted, however, that this alternative is not feasible because the New York
courts have held that the statute does not apply to proceedings designed to yield the initial
order of paternity against the nonresident respondent. Recognizing this situation, the courts
have urged petitioners to base their suits upon article 5 of the Family Court Act. See
Martha D. v. Ronald C. D., 99 Misc. 2d 334, 335, 416 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (Family Ct. N.Y.
County 1979); Gloria M. v. Frank T., 66 Misc. 2d 1096, 1097, 322 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (Family
Ct. N.Y. County 1971). The Nilsa l Iding, however, appears to have eliminated this
alternative.
10 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 104 Misc. 2d 611, 615, 428 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611
(Family Ct. N.Y. County 1980). It appears that in order to invoke the family court's limited
paternity jurisdiction, the petition must not only seek an order of filiation but must also
seek support for the child. E.g., Salvatore S. v. Anthony S., 58 App. Div. 2d 867, 867-68, 396
N.Y.S.2d 872, 872-73 (2d Dep't 1977); Edward K. v. Marcy R., 106 Misc. 2d 506, 507, 434
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order has been entered, principles of continuing jurisdiction19
would render resort to CPLR 302(b) unnecessary in a subsequent
proceeding.20 Hence, by equating an obligation accruing under
New York law with a prior order of a family court, the Nilsa court
apparently has transformed the "obligation" proviso of the statute
into mere surplusage. Since the legislature enacted CPLR 302(b) in
order to remove the jurisdictional barriers facing deserted women
whose "families might [otherwise] 'wind up on welfare,' ,21 it
N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (Family Ct. Kings County 1980); Czajak v. Vavonese, 104 Misc. 2d 601,
601, 609, 428 N.Y.S.2d 986, 986, 992 (Family Ct. Onondaga County 1980). But see John J. S.
v. Theresa L., 99 Misc. 2d 578, 578-82, 416 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1001-03 (Family Ct. Bronx
County 1979). The reasoning used to support this conclusion appears to rest on the unique
nature of a declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment is an unconventional remedy,
only available where it will serve some practical and useful purpose. See, e.g., Krieger v.
Krieger, 25 N.Y.2d 364, 366, 254 N.E.2d 750, 750, 306 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (1969); James v.
Alderton Dock Yards, Ltd., 256 N.Y. 298, 305, 176 N.E. 401, 403-04 (1931); Elkort v. 490
West End Ave. Co., 38 App. Div. 2d 1, 4, 326 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (1st Dep't 1971).
" Under the doctrine of continuing jurisdiction, a court which has properly exercised
its power over a defendant's person retains jurisdiction to adjudicate all further proceedings
arising out of the cause of action, even if the defendant is no longer amenable to process.
See, e.g., Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 (1913); Estate of Einstoss v. Green-
berg, 26 N.Y.2d 181, 187, 257 N.E.2d 637, 639-40, 309 N.Y.S.2d 184, 188 (1970); RETATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 26, comment b, illustration 1; id. comment g, illus-
trations 9-10 (1971); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 31 (3d ed. 1977).
20 Many New York courts have found the concept of continuing jurisdiction applicable
to family court and matrimonial proceedings. In these cases, the courts have held that after
the entry of a judgment ordering alimony and child support, the original exercise of the
judicial power over the parties "continues," thus permitting later modifications of such or-
ders without an additional showing of a jurisdictional basis. See, e.g., Baron v. Baron, 75
App. Div. 2d 797, 797-98, 427 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (2d Dep't 1980); Oster v. Oster, 54 App.
Div. 2d 584, 584, 387 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (2d Dep't 1976); lannone v. Iannone, 78 Misc. 2d
294, 295, 355 N.Y.S.2d 992, 994 (Family Ct. Suffolk County 1974); Anonymous v. Anony-
mous, 62 Misc. 2d 758, 759, 309 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970); Mas-
simino v. Massimino, 5 Misc. 2d 1041, 1044-45, 162 N.Y.S.2d 646, 649-50 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1957); Grenier v. Grenier, 175 Misc. 406, 408, 23 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595-96 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1940), af'd, 261 App. Div. 1043, 27 N.Y.S.2d 449 (4th Dep't 1941). There is one case
representing contrary authority in New York, which holds that an assertion of in personam
jurisdiction does not "continue" in subsequent family court support proceedings. See Was-
serman v. Wasserman, 43 App. Div. 2d 951, 952, 352 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (2d Dep't 1974). This
case appears to be an aberration, however, for the concept of continuing in personam juris-
diction has not only been recognized by most New York courts, see supra, but has been
acknowledged by the highest courts of numerous states as well, see, e.g., Imperial v. Hardy,
302 So. 2d 5, 8 (La. 1974); Elliot v. Elliot, 431 A.2d 55, 57 (Me. 1981); Glading v. Furman,
282 Md. 200, 204-05, 383 A.2d 398, 401 (1978); Bjordahl v. Bjordahl, 308 N.W.2d 817, 818
(Minn. 1981); Everhart v. Everhart, 261 S.C. 322, 325, 200 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1973); Fortner v.
Fortner, 282 S.E.2d 48, 51 (W. Va. 1981) (applying Virginia law); State ex rel. Ravitz v. Fox,
273 S.E.2d 370, 373 (W. Va. 1980); see Dorey v. Dorey, 609 F.2d 1128, 1131 (5th Cir. 1980)
(applying California law).
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 104 Misc. 2d 611, 615, 428 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (Family Ct.
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seems that the court's interpretation does not comport with the
statute's legislative purpose.
Moreover, it is submitted that the second department properly
could have sustained jurisdiction by finding that the failure of a
putative father to support his illegitimate child is a tortious act
within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(2). 2  A number of courts in
other states have sustained jurisdiction in paternity suits under
similar statutes, reasoning that the failure to'support an illegiti-
mate child is a breach of a legal duty.23 Some state courts, how-
ever, have refused to interpret their "tortious act" long-arm stat-
utes in this manner, opining that the main issue in a paternity
proceeding is the establishment of paternity and that the question
of financial support is merely ancillary.2 4 Since New York's legisla-
N.Y. County 1980) (quoting Memorandum of Assemblyman Blumenthal, reprinted in
[1974] N.Y. LEGis. ANN. 41). Although the legislative memorandum accompanying section
302(b) does not mention paternity suits, it seems that the statute's protection should be
equally applied to the unwed mothers of illegitimate children who are likely to wind up on
welfare. Indeed, the legislature has recognized this very real possibility by providing that
proceedings to establish paternity and compel support may be commenced by a public wel-
fare official "if the mother or child is or is likely to become a public charge ... " N.Y. FAM.
CT. AcT (29A) § 522 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-1982).
22 CPLR 302(a)(2) provides:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from
any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or
through an agent:
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defa-
mation of character arising from the act ....
CPLR 302(a)(2) (1972). The Nilsa court noted that jurisdiction would not be available
under this section because "an act of consensual sexual intercourse is not a 'tortious act'
within the meaning of that provision .... 84 App. Div. 2d 295, 296 n.2, 445 N.Y.S.2d 579,
581 n.2. The court did not consider, however, the question whether the breach of the puta-
tive father's duty to support his illegitimate child would qualify as a "tortious act."
23 E.g., Poindexter v. Willis, 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 217-18, 231 N.E.2d 1, 3 (App. Ct. 1967);
Neill v. Ridner, 153 Ind. App. 149, 152, 286 N.E.2d 427, 429 (Ct. App. 1972); Howells v.
McKibben, 281 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Minn. 1979); State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn.
438, 441, 216 N.W.2d 140, 142-43 (1974); accord, Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 789
(Iowa 1980); see Poindexter v. Willis, 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 256 N.E.2d 254, 259 (1970) (giving
full faith and credit to Illinois judgment using "tortious act" long-arm statute to support the
exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident in paternity suit). Notably, the fear of fraudulent
claims should be insufficient to justify the rejection of tortious act jurisdiction in paternity
cases, for the courts may require "at least a minimal factual recitation of 'probable' father-
hood, beyond a bare allegation" of paternity. State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438,
442, 216 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1974).
24 E.g., A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 180 Colo. 439, 442, 507 P.2d 468, 469 (1973); State ex rel.
Larimore v. Synder, 206 Neb. 64, 69, 291 N.W.2d 241, 244 (1980); State ex rel. McKenna v.
Bennet, 28 Or. App. 155, 160, 558 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Ct. App. 1977); Barnhart v. Madvig, 526
19821
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ture has made it quite clear that paternity proceedings are
designed to promote the welfare of illegitimate children,25 the issue
of support is considered not an ancillary matter, but one of pri-
mary significance. Hence, those jurisdictions which regard failure
to support as breach of a legal duty comport more closely with
New York's statutory scheme, and, therefore, it is suggested that
CPLR 302(a)(2) be applied to the nonresident putative father.26
Anthony Fischetti
INSURANCE LAW
Ins. Law § 167(1): Child's infancy will not excuse requirement of
timely notice to insurer in intrafamily claim
Liability insurance contracts generally provide that an insured
must timely notify his insurer of a claim in order to invoke the
insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify such claim.27 Addi-
S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tenn. 1975).
25 See note 2 supra.
28 If the exercise of jurisdiction is not to be had by resort to CPLR 302(a)(2) or 302(b),
it is hoped that the legislature will provide a clear basis for jurisdiction in the paternity
context. Long-arm statutes aimed specifically at exercising jurisdiction over nonresident pu-
tative fathers have been enacted in at least two states. See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-302(a)
(1981); KAN. CIv. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60-308(b)(10) (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1981-1982). In
addition, eight other states have enacted versions of the Uniform Parentage Act which per-
mits the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over any person whose act of sexual inter-
course within the state causes a child to be conceived. See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 8(b).
It is clear that statutes which base in personam jurisdiction upon the act of sexual inter-
course within the state satisfy the minimum contacts test of due process. E.g., Bebeau v.
Berger, 22 Ariz. App. 522, 523, 529 P.2d 234, 235 (Ct. App. 1975); Bell v. Arnold, 248 Ga. 9,
9-10, 279 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1981); Neil v. Ridner, 153 Ind. App. 149, 154, 286 N.E.2d 427, 429
(Ct. App. 1972); Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Iowa 1980); Howells v. McKibben,
281 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. 1979); State ex rel. Larimore v. Snyder, 206 Neb. 64, 69, 291
N.W.2d 241, 245 (1980); Poindexter v. Willis, 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 210, 256 N.E.2d 254, 260
(1970); State ex rel. McKenna v. Bennett, 28 Or. App. 155, 558 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Ct. App.
1977).
27 See generally 8 J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4732
(1981). The purpose of the notice requirement in a liability insurance policy is to afford an
insurance company an opportunity to investigate claims. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 51 Misc. 2d 116, 122, 273 N.Y.S.2d 112, 120 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 28 App. Div. 2d 815, 281 N.Y.S.2d 452 (4th Dep't 1967); 8
J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra, § 4731, at 2; Note, Liability Insurance Policy De-
fenses and the Duty to Defend, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1436, 1436-37 (1955). Indeed, an insurance
company in receipt of prompt notice is better able to prepare defenses because it can ob-
